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The iron jaws of greed once clinched upon a privilege never
relax until loosened by the resistless power of the people.

SOME THOUGHTS ON SECTION 606 OF THE CIVIL
CODE.
By Lillard Carter*
Evidence has been defined as the means by which disputed
facts in litigation are determined. We may go further. It is the
only means provided by law by which disputed facts may be determined. The provisions of the Kentucky code limiting testimony
are so narrow and rigid that it is often difficult for the judge and
jury to ascertain the facts. The facts involved are so hedged about
by code provisions that all the truth frequently cannot be told, and
only a very imperfect presentation of the facts involved can be
made.
The law of evidence, like substantive law, has been the product
of a very slow evolution, changing from time to time to meet the
new conditions incident to the slow and continuous development
of the Anglo-Saxon race. And in this we have come far. It is a
far cry from a trial by the judgment of God and the trial by combat to a trial by a jury whose verdict was rendered in favor of the
party producing the greater number of witnesses. For it should not
be forgotten that under the laws of our ancestors the right of a cause
was determined by the number of witnesses rather than by the pertinency of their testimony. There was much progress from the time of
such procedure to the comparatively recent adoption of the doctrine
that the jury are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight of their testimony.
No sound basis for the trial of causes was reached until it
became established law that it is the province of the jury to determine what weight to attach to the testimony of witnesses. The
jury is composed of mature men of the vicinage and, therefore, qual*Of the Anderson county bar, Lawrenceburg, 3Ky.
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ified to understand the parties and the transaction under consideration. They are without interest in the subject matter and,
under oath, a true verdict to render. They are chosen under such
safeguards as insure an average citizenship of average intelligence.
There is no good reason why not only an honest and fair verdict
should not result in every trial, but that a just and intelligent verdict should not be returned in every legal contest, if the parties
litigant were permitted to introduce all the evidence. Strange as
it may seem, it is nevertheless true, that much evidence that might
be and often would be decisive of causes cannot be given to te
jury because of positive inhibitions of our Code of Practice. It is
scarcely credible that our law prohibits certain persons of mature
age and sound mind, who may be and often are the only persons
on earth cognizant of the real facts of important causes from appearing as witnesses and making the facts known, of which they
are the sole repositories, to those who must decide on the facts.
Of course, there is a legal reason for this. One of its friends
once defined the law to be the perfection of human reason. And
this definition was given at a time when the law was much less
reasonable than now. The learned gentleman would have come
nearer the mark had he written that the reasoning of the law is
the regson of the law. And he might have added that the reasoning of the law and the reasoning of philosophy sometimes differ
widely, and that the trend of the law is along the way blazed by
philosophy, but that, like Peter, it follows afar off. The bench and
the legislature which have expressed the law and are its mouthpieces and exponents, have given as their reason for the suppression of testimony, to which I have just referred, that to permit certain persons to testify would.either be against the public policy
or invite perjury.
Formerly, no party to a suit, notwithstanding the fact that in
almost every case the parties were the persons who knew most
about the facts and frequently the only ones who knew anything
about them, was permitted to testify at all.
"The general rule is, that a party cannot be permitted to give
evidence in his own cause. This, it is said, is not founded merely
on the consideration of his interest, but partly on principles of
general policy, and for the prevention of perjury."
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Higdon's Heirs vs. Higdon's Devisees, 6 J. J. Mar. 48.
Section 670 of the code of 1851 provides:
"The following persons shall be incompetent to testify:
Subsection 6. Persons interested in an issue, in behalf of themselves, and parties to an issue, in behalf of themselves or those united
with them in the issue."
Not until the act of May 1, 1886, was a man charged with a
criminal or penal offense in Kentucky permitted to open his mouth
as a witness in his own behalf. It mattered nothing that he was
frequently the only person in the world that knew the facts or
any of the facts. It mattered nothing that in many cases there
was neither physical fact nor circumstance from which the human
mind could draw any safe or sound conclusion, if indeed it -could
reach any conclusion at all. The only witness, the one who knew
all the facts, was denied the privilege of testifying; his mouth was
sealed by the law and the only possible light shut out from the
jury. We marvel how justice was wrought out by the courts.
Section 605 of the Civil Code now provides: "Subject to the ex
ceptions and modifications contained in section 606, every person
is competent to testify for himself or another, unless he be found
by the court incapable of understanding the facts concerning which
his testimony is offered."
The trend of modern thought is toward changing that section so that it will read: "Every person
is competent to testify for himself or another, who is capable of
understanding the facts concerning which his testimony is offered."
The exceptions and modifications contained in section 606 are
unsound in reason- and based on false logic, and not only work
hardship, but frequently cause the miscarriage of justice. The
truth can be found only by the presentation of the facts and all
the facts. And it is not sufficient reason for denying certain persons disqualified-as -witnesses by section 606, to urge that because
of certain relations to parties in interest or because the party
against whom or.whose representatives he might testify is dead or
is under' some disability. The whole procedure of our courts is
predicated upon the theory that witnesses under oath detail the
facts truthfully. Otherwise, our whole system of jurisprudence
is a hoax. Then why should we make the exceptions contained in
section 6067
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In the code of 1851, section 670, we find this language: "The
following persons shall be incompetent to testify. . .
Subsection 4: "Husband and wife, for or against each other, or concerning any communication made by one to the other, during marriage,
whether called as a witness while that relation subsisted or afterwards." Public policy was thought to demand so much to protect
the holy state of matrimony and to safeguard the loving spouse
from the temptation to commit the crime of perjury. For in the
case cited, supra, the Court of -Appeals says: " . . . it is a rule,
that the husband and wife cannot be witnesses for nor against
each other. The identity of their interest renders it improper that
the one should appear as witness for the other; and the most obvious principles of public policy declare, that neither should be
allowed to give evidence against the other, as it would be strongly
calculated to create distrust, and destroy that harmony and conjugal affection so important not only to the happiness of themselves
and family, but to the interest of society." Such is still the reason of the courts, and these ideas have prevented the General Assembly from removing a venerable obstruction to progress. The
same reasoning was used, as we have seen, as justification for the
law denying to a party the privilege of testifying in his own behalf. It is only within the memory of persons now living that parties to issues have been permitted by the law to face a jury and
detail the facts at issue. If it is a sound policy to permit the party
to testify, and this -no one now denies, why, may I ask, is it improper that the husband or wife of the party should testify? That
interest that does not disqualify the party himself from testifying
can by no juggling of logic disqualify the husband or wife of such
party, whose interest is manifestly less personal. Nor can we agree
with the idea that the* spouse should be denied the privilege of
testifying for the reason, "that it would be strongly calculated
to create distrust and destroy that harmony and conjugal affection so important, not only to the happiness of themselves and family, but to the interests of society."
Those words suggest the days of chivalry, and must have been
written when Kentucky gentlemen all read Sir Walter Scott, kept
their wives secluded in the home, and took over all their property
on marriage as a matter of right under the beneficent provisions of
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the common law. That may have worked well in the days of
coverture. But the wife is now an entity, a human being, a citizen. All the ways of the earth are open to her. She pursues all
business avocations and fills all professions. In a few years she
will be admitted to man's last stronghold and exercise the right
of suffrage. I submit that no law ought to protect those guilty of
wrong by sealing the mouth of the spouse who knows the facts
and is willing to testify. What sort of a public policy is that?
Is justice and right between parties litigant less sacred than the
relation of husband and wife? Again, submit that no husband
nor wife should distrust the spouse or feel less affection because
that spouse has told the truth that justice might be done. We
cannot build our sacred institutions, we cannot sanctify home, we
cannot inspire or perpetuate affection between husband and wife
by a lie or by the suppression of the truth. And logic might suggest
that permitting the husband or wife to testify against the other
might be a great restraint against wrongdoing.
Subsection 4 of section 670 of the code of 1851 has been modified several times, as appears from the present code. It will be
noted that it was so amended that the husband or wife may testify
for the other in an action for lost baggage, or its value against a
common carrier, an inkeeper, or a wrongdoer. It has been amended'
so that either, but not both, of them may testify in actions which
might have been brought by or against the wife, if she had been
unmarried. It has been so amended that when one of them acts
as agent for the other, either of them may testify as to any matter
cohnected with the agency. And it has been so amended that in
actions for divorce upon the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment either, or both, husband and wife may testify. In all other
respects the law remains as in 1851.
If it is sound public policy to permit the husband and wife to
testify in actions for divorce where the ground of the action is cruel
and inhuman treatment, why is it not sound public policy to permit
them to testify when divorce is sought on any other statutory
ground ?
Frequently, they are the only parties who know any of the
pertinent facts, and this is true in the extremest cases. Neither
the husband nor the wife commits those acts for which the law
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-provides the remedy of divorce in public, as a rule, nor when there
are witnesses. Many of them are more likely to be known to the
spouse than to any other person. In many extreme cases the spouse
is the only witness. Is it sound public policy to shut out the
light, to close the mouth of the suffering and by so doing to
close the door to relief from intolerable conditions?
And to my mind the provisions of subsection 2 of section 606
of the code are as illogical and 'fruitful of wrong as that section
itself. It-provides that, "no person shall testify for himself concerning, any verbal statement of, or any transaction with, or any
act done or omitted to be done by, an infant under fourteen years
of age, or by one 'who is of unsound'mind or dead when the testimony is' offered," except under certain conditions set out in that
subsection.. This provision is evidently' grounded on the belief
that advantage will be taken of the dead, the lunatic or the infant, as the case may be, and that because both sides to the controversy are not .equally represented in the testimony, neither
should be permitted- to testify. In other words, the logic of the
section is that inasmuch as the party on the one side is dead, and
therefore unable to testify, or presumably less able to Present his
side on the witness stand because of insanity or infancy, the party
otherwise competent, should not be permitted to tell the facts.
The same course of reasoning would repeal the act by which parties to actions were made competent witnesses in their own behalf.
And it will be borne in mind 'that under the provisions of the
criminal code 'one- charged -with murder may testify in his: own
behalf, although his. victim is dead.. No two parties are ever equally"
matched in power of imparting their causes. And if witnesses are
to' be rendered incompetent to testify because they are more able
than witnesses on the 'opposite side, courts of justice will become
farces. It frequently happens that men of affairs contract large
credits, in the confidence of friendship without written evidence
.of their transactions. Should the debtor die, under the law of
evidence in this state, the debt becomes of no more 'value than a
debt of honor and the creditor is without relief. This is .only one
of many illustrations that might be cited.
It will.not do .to say that'the repeal of this provision will.open
the floodgates to perjury, for Our whole system of 'evidence and
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judicature is based upon the presumption that witnesses of sound
mind and mature understanding, when under oath, may be trusted
to tell the truth. We have buttressed this presumption with a law
providing a severe penalty for perjury. It is fundamental that
the jury, or the judge, when he tries a cause without the intervention of a jury, must determine the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight of their testimony. They will learn that the opposite
party is dead, or an infant, or insane and that the party testifying
is a party in interest, and the nature of the interest. They may
safely be permitted to hear all the evidence from all who know,
and to reach a just conclusion as to the weight to be given the testimony of each witness.
The suppression of the facts can never aid in the administration of justice in our courts. No person who knows any facts that
would aid the court and jury in reaching the correct solution of
an issue should be incompetent as a witness for any reason. Section 606 should be amended and the lights turned on.

